Michigan Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 5

1940

LIBEL AND SLANDER - PRIVILEGE - LIABILITY OF A TELEGRAPH
COMPANY FOR TRANSMTITING A LIBELOUS MESSAGE
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, LIBEL AND SLANDER - PRIVILEGE - LIABILITY OF A TELEGRAPH COMPANY FOR
TRANSMTITING A LIBELOUS MESSAGE, 38 MICH. L. REV. 734 (1940).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol38/iss5/19

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

734

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

LIBEL AND SLANDER - PRIVILEGE - LIABILITY OF A TELEGRAPH
COMPANY FOR TRANSMTITING A LIBELOUS MESSAGE - Defendant telegraph
company transmitted to ten officers of an international union a telegram from
members of a local union. The contents related to labor affairs and were
admittedly libelous per se as to the plaintiff, naming him as "responsible for
the murder of our brother officer Borson." Held, verdict for plaintiff set aside
and new trial ordered, because plaintiff has failed to justify recovery by furnishing evidence of actual malice or bad faith by the defendant. Klein v. Western
Union Tel Co., 257 App. Div. 336, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 441 (1939), appeal
withdrawn, (N. Y. 1939) 24 N. E. (2d) 491.
The rule commonly stated in texts that a telegraph company is civilly liable
for transmitting a manifestly defamatory message unless the sender is privileged.1 This rule resembles that of the ordinary liability for defamation, but

4th ed., 226, 418 (1924); ODGERS, LIBEL AND
6th ed., 134, 245, 295 (1929). These texts agree that the contents of a
telegram are communicated or published to all clerks through whose hands the message passes. It is also agreed that these clerks are outside a privilege between the sender
and the addressee, or to the same effect, that the use of a telegram (postcard is classed
with the telegram here) in ordinary cases is unnecessary publication and hence exceeds
the privilege. It is worthwhile to note that ODGERS, op. cit., p. 295, distinguishes
between the postcard and the telegram, as the former is read by many more, being
exposed to view from the moment of writing, while a telegram is in transit only for
minutes and then sealed. However, the writers do not mention that this difference
has been recognized by different legal liabilities for the two types of libel.
The libel in the principal case would have been privileged if sent by letter. W,hen
1 NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL,
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the courts have tended to depart from the general rules of defamation to give
telegraph companies a qualified privilege even when the sender has none.2 The
telegraph company has been held privileged if the message, although possibly
defamatory, was ambiguous and the operator acted in good faith and without
negligence. 8 In another field of defamation the courts have declared the typing
of a defamatory letter by a stenographer as no publication of a libel 4 or as
privileged.5 This grant of conditional privilege was carried over into a libelous
telegram case as an analogy to support a qualified privilege for the transmission
of a libelous message received in the ordinary course of business.6 There was no
mention of the sender having a privilege, actual or apparent, in that case. The
principal case follows the trend toward the granting of a qualified privilege to the
telegraph company and is supported by authority.7 The court did not deny that
there was a publication to the agents of the company but said this was a "limited
and restricted" publication with little chance of repetition and personal damage.
This assumption is reasonable, considering the small number of employees
the telegram was used, privilege depended on whether that publication was reasonably
necessary. Williamson v. Freer, L. R. 9 C. P. 393 (1874). The American cases do
not discuss this question of exceeding privilege. Although the New York court in the
principal case apparently recognized a conditional privilege in the defendant W estem
Union Company, the opinion fails to outline the boundaries of the privilege.
2 Smith, "Liability of a Telegraph Company for Transmitting a Defamatory
Message," 20 CoL. L. REv. 30,369 (1920). This is the leading article in the field and
develops the idea that such a departure from tort rules is being made. See cases collected in 63 A. L. R. n18 (1929).
3 Grisham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 238 Mo. 480, 142 S. W. 271 (1911)
("Board here sold out Memphis Saturday morning," held, defendant not guilty of
maliciously publishing a libel). Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18,
67 N. W. 646, 33 L. R. A. 302 (1896), contains the classic example of telegram
ambiguity-"Slippery Sam, your name is pants." It is suggested in several cases that
to re'luire agents capable of detecting libel in such messages would be too great a burden
on the companies.
4 Owen v. J. S. Ogilvie Pub. Co., 32 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. S. 1033 (1898),
is the leading American case for this doctrine. But contra, Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md.
48, 48 A. 730 (1901). See cases collected in 19 M1cH. L. REv. 106 (1920) and 18
A. L. R. 776 (1922).
5 Later thought and weight of authority is that there is a publication to a third
party, however routine the job may be. Admitting this, we may apply the rules of
qualified privilege protecting the necessary means of communication.
6 Flynn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 199 Wis. 124, 225 N.W. 742 (1929); 5 Wis.
L. REv. 297 ( 1929) ; 63 A. L. R. I I I 8 ( 1929). The court emphasized the need of
assuring to small communities this means of rapid communication even though the parttime operators could not be expected to be experienced in the law of defamation.
7 Smith, "Liability of a Telegraph Company for Transmitting a Defamatory
Message," 20 CoL. L. REV. 30, 369 at 393 ( 1920~: "a belief that the one making
the request had an interest or duty with reference to the subject matter may give rise to
a qualified privilege." The courts are not in agreement in support of Smith's statement.
Paton v. Great Northwestern Tel. Co., 141 Minn. 430, 170 N. W. 511 (1919), held a
reasonable belief is required of the operator; 29 M1cH. L. REv. 339 at 344 (1931),
states "the rule holding that the transmission of a defamatory message by a telegraph
company is privileged reaches the sound desirable result.•••"
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involved and the duty not to divulge messages. 8 In holding this limited publication to be privileged, the court relied on strong reasons of public policy. To be
of any economic value, the telegraph company has to make quick decisions and
insist on speed. Telegraph companies are said to have a peculiar need for this
privilege. The libel rules applicable to newspaper and radio companies are not
analogous, as those companies are not public service corporations with duties to
serve all who apply. Also the possibility of damage from an unrestricted publication or utterance by the latter companies is so great that a privilege is not
deemed desirable. 9 The refusal of a proper message may expose the company
to heavy penalties for violation of a public service statute, the principal case
involving both state and federal statutes.w For this reason, the companies are
apt to decide hard questions of doubtful defamatory meaning in favor of the
sender. But in the absence of a qualified privilege this action may leave the
company open to libel suits. Hence the duty to accept and transmit messages is
commonly cited as a reason for the qualified privilege when granted.11 The
qualified priyilege should be allowed when the message is ambiguous as to
defamatory meaning or, if manifestly defamatory, when the sender is actually
or apparently privileged.
8 The courts have applied a common-law duty on the companies to refrain from
divulging contents of messages entrusted to them for transmission. JoNES, TELEGRAPH
AND TELEPHONE CoMPANIES, 2d ed., § 3 I I ( I 9 I 6). This has been superseded in
some states by penal statutes forbidding the disclosure of contents of messages. Wis. Stat.
(1937), §§ 348.36, 348.361; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), §§ 11677, 17047. Also
CooK, TELEGRAPH LAW 205 (1920).
9 Vold, "The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio," 19 MINN. L. REv.
611 at 652 (1935). The writer has set forth the distinct position of the telegraph
company's conditional privilege and the justification for it on grounds of the duty to
transmit, limited publication and the urgency of the business.
1 Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 1070, 47 U.S. C. (1934),
§ 202(a); N. Y. Consol. Laws (1909), c. 63, "Transportation Corporations Law,"
§ 103 [amended by laws (1926), c. 762, § 1], now § 28: "Every such corporation
shall receive dispatches • • • from and for any person, and on payment of the usual
charges ••• transmit the same with impartiality and good faith ••• and if it neglects
or refuses so to do, it shall pay one hundred dollars for each such refusal or neglect••••"
There seems also to be a common-law duty, the statutes like those above having
been held to be merely declaratory of the common law. JoNES, TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE COMPANIES, 2d ed., § 255 (1916). Note that the companies are not
common carriers as they are not insurers of the correct transmission of messages. Ibid.,
§ 26.
11 Nye v. Western Union Tel. Co., (C. C. Minn. 1900) 104 F. 628 at 631.
The- court said that where the message was not necessarily defamatory "it would be
his duty to send it, and for the performance of that duty the telegraph company would
incur no responsibility." Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18 at 23,
67 N. W. 646 ( l 896): "He must decide promptly, and forward the message without
delay, if it is a proper one, and for any honest error of judgment .•. the telegraph
company cannot be held responsible." Grisham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 238 Mo.
480 at 495, 142 S. W. 271 (1911): "A large proportion of the messages that pass
through his hands are more or less obscure. His first duty is prompt service. The law
does not require him to look for a meaning not manifest..•." See Flynn v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 199 Wis. 124, 225 N. W. 742 (1929).
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"Its duty and business is speedily to send dispatches presented to it. It is impractical and unreasonable to expect it when such dispatches are presented to investigate and find out the facts regarding such statements . . • made to it • • • when this
telegram was presented, before it acts and decides to send it or to refuse to send it."
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Braun, (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) 294 F. 167 at 170. This
reasoning is in accordance with the general rules and basis of privilege. A privileged
occasion is one where the publication is "fairly made by a person in the discharge of
some public or private duty, whether legal or moral." Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C. M.
& R. 181 at 193, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044 (1834).

